| The evolution of value systems is not realized merely through a change in external behaviors; rather, it requires a transformation in the foundations of valuation, in the will of social actors, and in social relations. The explanation of how the transition from the culture of jāhiliyyah (pre-Islamic ignorance) to the society of faith occurs, and of the relationship between the inner transformation of the human being and the reform of social structures, is therefore among the important issues of the social exegesis of the Qur՚an. The present study seeks to explain and compare the exegetical capacities of al-Mīzān and Min Waḥy al-Qur’an in analyzing the foundations, factors, obstacles, and indicators of this transformation. The research is organized through a library-based method, employing a descriptive–analytical approach, a comparative approach, and qualitative content analysis: relevant propositions were extracted from the two exegeses and categorized and compared on the basis of the following axes—the concept of jāhiliyyah and the society of faith, the foundations of transformation, the driving factors, the obstacles, and the indicators of the desired society. The findings show that both exegeses regard jāhiliyyah as an enduring, reproducible pattern of thought and behavior, and both emphasize human will, the gradualness of transformation, justice, brotherhood, social responsibility, and the negation of domination. In al-Mīzān, however, the predominant emphasis is on a philosophical–social explanation of transformation and on the role of conventional perceptions (iʿtibārāt) and the institutionalization of values, whereas Min Waḥy al-Qur՚ān concentrates more on human agency, the negation of historical determinism, collective vigilance, and resistance against tyrannical (ṭāghūtī) structures. Likewise, al-Mīzān identifies unjust exploitation, and Faḍlullāh identifies unequal relations of power, as among the principal obstacles to transformation. The comparative outcome of the research indicates the possibility of reconstructing an analytical relation between the reform of social relations and the awakening of human agency—without this reconstruction being taken as an explicit or staged model proposed by either of the two exegetes. |
