An Analysis of Islamic Movements in the Islamic World With an Emphasis on the Islamic Awakening in the Middle East and Northern Africa

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Abstract

Islamic civilization has gone through many changes of fortune. In the early years of Islam, Moslems were able to create societies which were unified and stable by relying on their faith and their political and scientific efforts. But the Mongol Invasion and the Christian Crusades provided the Islamic civilization with serious challenges, and a renewed blooming of the civilizations in Iran, India and under the Ottomans was nipped in the bud with the colonial policies of the West. It was in the context of these challenges that Islamic movements began to take shape in the territories of Islam.

This paper aims to provide an analysis of these movements as they have developed in the seedbed of Islamic civilization. We begin with a summary overview of the progress of Islamic civilization, and follow this with an analysis of the Islamic Awakening movement, which we treat under its four waves. The Islamic Awakening initially began with the intelligentsia within the Islamic world, each of which had a different view as how best to dislodge the Islamic world from the rut in which it found itself. After this first phase, the people entered the fray and the Islamic Awakening took on the characteristics of a people’s movement, and was able to score some victories in certain regions.

Keywords: Islamic movements, Islamic Awakening, Arab Spring, Islamic civilization, Colonialism, Nationalism, Religious identity.
Introduction

Social and political phenomena are better appreciated when they are understood in their historical contexts, as this lends such understanding a more holistic view, which in turn provides for a more accurate and richer appreciation of the subject at hand. The political movements which have arisen within the world of Islam in the last two centuries, some of which constitute the most important developments in the Islamic world, are no exception to this general rule. And while it is true that attempting to attain to an understanding of these movements within the timeframes in which they developed is not an easy undertaking, it is possible, nevertheless, to analyze and to attain to a comprehensive understanding of these movements as they developed within the seedbed of Islamicate civilization.

In order for us to be able to place the phenomenon which has come to be known as the Islamic Awakening in the context of the political developments which have taken place throughout the political history of the Islamic world, we shall first do a brief survey of Islamic history from a macro-sociological perspective. On one hand, this will help in understanding the current situation, and on the other, it will allow for greater degrees of probability in our efforts at predicting the future trajectory of the Islamic Awakening. Thus, we will endeavor to maintain the historical perspective in the periphery of our vision so that we can keep a coherent big picture in mind when looking at current events in our efforts at arriving at an analysis of the various Islamic movements within the history of Islamicate civilization.

One of the main questions which this paper will attempt to answer is whether the phenomenon which has come to be known as the Islamic Awakening is one which is independent of and cut off from the stream
of developments in the political history of the Islamic world, or whether it is part of a cultural-historical continuum. If we take a developmental approach in our analysis of sociological issues, we can say that the movements in the last two centuries within the world of Islam are not independent of the greater currents that course through the history of the Islamic world; but that rather, they are best understood as a part of the big picture of a great civilization. Thus, in order to understand this cultural-historical continuum, we will first do a general survey of the civilizational background which has acted as the backdrop to the Islamic Awakening. We shall follow this with an analysis of the Islamic Awakening movement as a milestone in this process, which will be undertaken in four subheadings representing the four distinct waves of the movement.

The Theoretical Framework

Islamic political movements have been analyzed under different models and theoretical frameworks. Some of these models have a secular outlook and analyze these movements in terms of how these movements measure up to democratic ideals and/ or use an analytical framework which reduces the nature of such movements to their economic elements. Examples of these include hegemony theory\(^1\) and the work of the New Third Worlders.\(^2\) Others have a religio-centric approach, such as the theory of colonialism\(^3\) of Khorshīd Ahmadi.\(^4\) These theories have not

1. One of the most prominent examples of this kind of perspective can be found in the works of Tom Butko, a political scientist at the University of Alberta. See, for example, Thomas J. Butko, *Revelation or Revolution: A Gramscian Approach to the rise of Political Islam*, British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies, Vol. 31 No 1 May 2004.


3. Cf. The Political Sociology of the Islamic Movements, Hamid Ahmadi, p. 27 and 28

4. Pakistani researcher and a member of the Jāme’ātIslami of Pakistan.
analyzed the Islamic movements with a vantage that places them within a greater temporal context, nor have they brought any comparative analysis to bear, comparing and contrasting a given movement with others; rather, they have simply provided an analysis of Islamic movements within the timeframe of their activity.

Richard Hrair Dekmejian¹ is a political thinker who has analyzed the Islamic movements within a historical context and with a macrosociological outlook. He believes that,

For any kind of comprehensive research into contemporary Islamic movements, it is necessary to investigate the emotional, spiritual, political, social and economic roots and the environment which acts as the seedbed for fundamentalist beliefs and actions. Based on an empirical-historical model, [it can be said that] there is a cause and effect correlation between social crises and the rise of revolutionary religious movements or revivalist religious movements which want to do away with the current official order and to establish a new society on the basis of their specific ideological programs.

Dekmejian believes that it is not possible to come to a true understanding of the phenomenon of Islamic revivalist movements using revamped western approaches or Marxist ones. And this is why he insists that in order to attain to a proper understanding of this phenomenon, it is necessary to have an understanding of the Islamist discourse and to pay attention to the social and intellectual developments that are taking place within Islamic societies.

¹. Richard Hrair Dekmejian (born 1933, Aleppo, Syria) is an Armenian American professor of political science at the University of Southern California in Los Angeles. His teachings are primarily focused on world leadership. He is also known for his experience on World Genocides as well as Global Terrorism. He is the author of *Islam in Revolution: Fundamentalism in the Arab World*. 
According to Dekmejian, the Islamic world has been suffering from a long-term crisis for over two centuries which encompasses social, cultural, economic, and most importantly, spiritual dimensions; and it is this crisis which has leant the impetus to the Islamic revivalist movements throughout the Islamic world whose aim is to revive Islam to its past glory. And this is no different, he states, than every other decline and fall in the Islamic world, all of which have been followed by an intellectual or political revivalist movement.  

Dekmejian views Islamic movements as being cyclical. From his perspective, the revivalist movements which have occurred throughout the history of Islamic societies appear under conditions wherein the society in question is afflicted with a widespread crisis.

It is our intention to proceed on the basis of this model using a historical methodology and a macro-sociological approach, as these Islamic movements are [only properly] analyzable in the broader context of Islamic civilization [as a whole]. This approach creates a kind of conceptual and intellectual continuum in the analysis of social movements which points towards the religious dimensions and priorities of these movements.

A Survey of the Civilizational Background of the Islamic Awakening Movement

An examination of the history of Islam shows that Islamic culture and civilization follows a determinate course and has evolved on bases which can be rationally understood and explained, and which likely are the crystallization of the philosophy of the history of Islam which repeats itself.

2. Ibid., pages 28-31.
The First Stage

The history of Islam started in Mecca with the call of the Most Noble Prophet. [The commissioning of the Prophet] is [thus] the starting point of Islamic civilization and culture.

The Second Stage

This important movement in the history of humanity crystalized with the migration of the nascent Islamic community to Yathreb and the establishment of an Islamic social and political constitutional order and government, after which Yathreb was called Madīnaʾ on-Nabī (City of the Prophet) or Madīna for short. It can be inferred from this symbolic change in nomenclature that the foundations for Islamic civilization were laid with this emigration.¹

The Third Stage

The third stage consists of the expansion of Islamicate civilization, which consists of two phases. The first phase was the spread of the religion of Islam in the Arabian peninsula²; and the second phase was its expansion throughout the civilized world of the time, inclusive of Mesopotamia, the Iranian plateau, Byzantium, Egypt, Abyssinia, Transoxiana, India, Greater China, Northern Africa, Andalusia and Southern Europe. The peak of this phase took place in the first and second centuries of Islam (7th and 8th centuries of the Christian era). In addition to greatly expanding the territory of Islam, these conquests also had many social, cultural and

¹. See Velāyati, Ali Akbar, Pouyāi-e Farhang va Tamaddon-e Islami (Peydāyesh va Shokoufāi, vol.1, Markaz-e Asnād va Tārikh-e Diplomāsi Vezārat-e Omour-e Khārejeh
². Cf. ibid. pages 41-46.
religious ramifications.¹

The Fourth Stage

This stage consists of the encounter of the newly founded civilization and culture of Islam with the ancient civilizations of the world, and the effort to understand these civilizations and to transfer [and assimilate their content]. This movement began in the second Islamic century and continued into its third and fourth centuries (8th to 10th centuries CE). This civilizational transference took place by way of three main arteries.

1. Translation, which was the most important method and medium by means of which this transference took place, and which has come to be known in the annals of historiography as the Translation Movement (nehzat-e tarjome).² The volume of the works that were translated, and the speed at which the translations took place were unprecedented up to this time in the ancient world. To provide a prominent case in point, a father and son team (Honayn b. Eshāq and Ishāq b. Honayn) translated over 200 books and treatises between the two of them, from Greek and


². This period has been addressed by the works related to the history of the Islamic civilization; among the most important works, one can refer to: Al-Fihrist, by Ibn-e Nadim (translated and researched by Mohammad Rezā Tajaddod, Amir Kabir, Tehran, 1987; Tabaqāt al-Atebbā and Akhbār al-‘Olamā bi Akhbār ak-Hokamā, by Ibn-e Ibi ‘Asibah; and Tārikh al-Hokamā, by Ibn-e Qafti. For more information, about the stages and influences of the translation movement on the Islamic civilization refer to Velāyati, Ali Akbar, Pouyāi-e Farhang va Tamaddon-e Islami (Peydāyesh va Shokoufāi), vol.1, p. 75 – 87.
Syriac to Arabic.¹

2. The founding of the Dār-ol-Hekma and Nezāmīya libraries.²

3. Transferring scientists and thinkers from areas outside of the territories of Islam to Islamic centers of learning; or to use the contemporary expression, a “brain-drain” [in reverse].³

The Fifth Stage

The fifth stage was the spontaneous blooming of the civilization of Islam, which started in the third Islamic century and continued to the

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fifth Islamic century (9th to 11th centuries CE). Some people are of the opinion that the Moslems acted as reliable trustees for the knowledge of the sciences which they received from ancient Greece and Byzantium and held onto them safely during the “Dark” Ages, to return them to the West during the movement to translate texts from Arabic to Latin which was particularly active in 15th century Andalusia (or present day Spain).¹ But the fact of the matter is that the Moslems made many changes in the development and application of these sciences based on their own philosophical, ontological and anthropological underpinnings and bearings. The changes which they effected were of a deep and all-encompassing nature and affected many if not all of the sciences, including mathematics, astronomy, physics, mechanics, medicine, chemistry, philosophy and logic, historiography, geography, literature and linguistics; and [the assimilation of these sciences] provided the background for and enabled the deepening of Islamic civilization. The manifestation of the flowering of this civilization can be seen in the social and political orders of the time and in the physical and architectural heritage which has come down to us from past eras.² The strength and prestige of this phase of Islamic civilization is such that its influence on Western civilization is still discussed to this day.³

The Sixth Stage

This was the stage where Islamic spirituality came into full bloom [especially] as expressed in its literature. The bond between spirituality

1. See, for example, The History of Science from Augustine to Galileo by A. C. Crombie, v. 1 pages 30-50.
and ethics is one of the wonders of Islamic culture. The depth of Islamic spirituality is such that it is beyond comparison with any other culture. Great men have drank their fill from this wellspring and attained to exalted summits, becoming stars in the night sky of the knowledge and wisdom of humanity. The flowering of this phase started in the 4th/11th century and reached its full bloom in the 7th/14th century.¹

The Seventh Stage

The seventh stage related to art. It can perhaps be said that the logic of history demands that the arts of calligraphy, painting and architecture will not become manifest in their transcendental forms until the rational and experimental sciences have reached their perfection, and until man’s knowledge concerning the world of being and life has not reached its ultimate depth, and until literature has not reached the peak of its perfection.² The power of Islamic art attained to such heights that its influence was felt even in Western culture.³ What is remarkable is that this artistic movement arose out of the ashes and in the wake of the two severe broadsides which Islamic civilization suffered at the hands of the Crusaders and the Mongol invaders, and brought with it the glad tiding of the continuity of life for Islam under the Safavid⁴, Ottoman and Mughal⁵ empires.

The Eighth Stage

This was the stage of decline. The two severe blows which Islamic

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² Ibid. pages 487 – 533.
³ Ibid. pages 616 – 660.
⁴ Ibid. pages 977 – 982.
⁵ Ibid. pages 940 – 951.
civilization suffered during the Crusades\(^1\) from the west and at the hands of the Mongol hordes in the east which lasted approximately two and three centuries respectively inflicted great damage to Islamic civilization and sapped the spirit and power of the Moslem peoples. The gains which were made with the acquisition of Egypt and the Levant were destroyed at the hands of the Crusaders and that which they had built in Transoxiana, Khorāsān and Iraq was razed by the Mongol invaders. These invasions blew the spirit of despondency and despair in the body of the ascendant culture of Islam with their unprecedented violence and cruelty, thereby undermining Islamic civilization at its roots.\(^2\)

While it remains true that Islam contains in its essence the ability to change and to adapt and to progress, the effects of these two tremendously destructive forces nevertheless brought about the decline of Islamic civilization, the nadir of which occurred in the 8\(^{th}\)/14\(^{th}\) century and in the first half of the 9\(^{th}\)/15\(^{th}\) century.


The Ninth Stage

This was the stage of the reemergence of the world of Islam. The final defeat of the Crusaders at the hands of Salāhed-Dīn-e ‘Ayūbī (Saladin) in the year 583 of the lunar Hegira calendar or 1187 of the Christian Era, and the defeat of the Mongols at the hands of the Mamlūk Sultanate of Egypt, the Levant, and the Hejaz in the battle of ‘Ayn Jārūt in southeastern Galilee in the year 1260. These developments brought about an era of relative security in the Levant, Asia Minor and northern Africa which enabled much of the cultural and scientific advances to be preserved.

In addition to the bravery of Salāhed-Dīn-e ‘Ayūbī and the steadfastness and fortitude of the Mamlūks of Egypt, mention must also be made of the foresight and penmanship of KhwājaNasīred-Dīn Tūsī, Khwāja Shams ed-Dīn of the Dīvān fame [Mohammad Joveynī], ‘Atā ol-MolkJoveynī, and Khwāja Rashīd ed-Dīn FadlollāhHamedānī who placed themselves in harm’s way in order to preserve what remained in the wake of the destruction and devastation of the Mongol hordes, most of whom lost their lives in this cause. The [contribution of] the efforts of these scholars was undoubtedly no less than that of those who went to battle [against the Crusaders and Mongol hordes] in Palestine and in the Levant.

With the continuity of the heritage of Islam which was salvaged from the burnt lands within the territories of Islam, new saplings sprouted and grew into the stout trees of the Ottoman,¹ Safavid,² and Mughal³ empires, which lent new life to the political life of the Islamic world.

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2. Ibid. pages 953-1007.
3. Ibid. pages 919-951.
The Tenth Stage

This stage is characterized by the beginning of the colonial era and the emergence of a new decline. After the European Renaissance, strong nations emerged in Europe; their need for cheap raw materials and consumer markets for their industrial products provided the impetus for their invasion of the Islamic world. Thus, the Portuguese invaded Africa, India, the port city of Muscat, and Iran; the English invaded the western territories of Islam, eastern Africa, the Indian sub-continent and Southeast Asia; and France invaded Egypt, and northern and western Africa; and Italy invaded northern and eastern Africa; and the Dutch invaded southeastern Asia. This phenomenon started in the fifteenth century and reached its peak in the nineteenth century.¹

The second foreign onslaught must be referred to as a Second Crusade which was more multifarious than the first. This second time, the Crusaders came with the same cruciform battle flag, but with their swords having been replaced with the rifle. But more fatal than that was their efforts at cultural transformation and the undermining of the beliefs of the Moslems and the other peoples who they brought under their sphere of influence and domination.

This all-encompassing act of the Westerners left its destructive footprint on the world of Islam and, in the words of Mohammad Qotb, ¹

drove the Moslem peoples into a new Era of Ignorance which was characterized by a new form of mental colonialism or by a new kind of colonialism which might be called “gilded colonialism”; and which was based on an intellectual and philosophical worldview which assumed the separation of the affairs of religion from those of the public sphere and of communal concerns. The “successful” example which these Western invaders used with reference to this issue was the experience of the West’s “advancement” in the field of its socio-political “liberation” from that of the rule of the Church in its watershed transformation from the “Dark” Ages to the era of its “Enlightenment”. [And they would invariably conclude this sermon by stating that] it is now, therefore, incumbent on you Moslems to unbind yourselves from the fetters of Islam if you are to step foot on this path of progress.

This kind of cultural infiltration and propaganda which was more effective than their cannon balls attracted a number of frustrated simpletons and disillusioned social and political activists from within the ranks of Moslem society to its cause, bringing about a strange phenomenon in Islamic society which had no past precedent, namely, that a number of nominal Moslems became unsalaried and unpaid advocates [of the causes] of Western thought. The Westerners could not better this way of effecting change within the community of Islam, and so they continued to foster this colonialist method in different shapes and forms, continually changing their methodology. This cycle of [cultural and intellectual] stagnation was more serious than that which the Islamic world encountered in the wake of the first attack of the Christian Crusaders and of the Mongol invasion, because in those episodes, the invaders became bogged down and were vanquished by the [higher] culture of the Moslems who were the victors in the battles. But in the second stagnation phase, the invaders were more
dominant culturally to begin with; and they had also brought with them what can be characterized as a kind of cultural technology that was bereft [of the attenuating fetters] of religion.

The intellectual onslaught of the West whose purpose was the transformation of Moslem culture shocked the world of Islam. Over and above the [negative] consequences of this onslaught, the shock caused constructive waves to ripple through the Islamic body politic whose effects were later manifested in the formation of successive historical movements within the Islamic world which we refer to as the “Islamic Awakening” or as a [general] call [upon the Moslems] to return to [their] Islam[ic roots].

The Eleventh Stage: The Islamic Awakening

The events of the last two hundred years within the world of Islam can be characterized as the history of the Islamic Awakening. This stage of [the] history [of the Islamic world] has gone through warps and woofs which have been informed by specific political, social, and cultural conditions throughout the breadth of the Islamic world. And it goes without saying that these changes have [not] been uniform in terms of their starting points, or in terms of the pace or the quality of the changes. For example, despite the fact that certain of [the initial] phases of the Islamic awakening started in the Arab world before they were manifested in Iran, nevertheless, the Islamic Revolution of Iran is presently clearly more advanced than many of the revolutions whose initial impetus preceded that of Iran’s revolution.

The task of the determination of a specific date for [the beginning of] the Islamic Awakening is not an easy one; but it is possible to refer to a given event or a series of events in each of these four territories as
the starting point of the Islamic Awakening and their encounter with the West.

The following can be cited as some of the most important events that brought about the awakening of the people of these territories to the new civilization: The failure of the Ottomans to conquer Vienna in 1683; the fall of the town of Azov into Russian hands in 1696; the signing of the Treaty of Karlowitz on 26 January 1699 in SremskiKarlovci, in modern-day Serbia, concluding the Austro-Ottoman War of 1683–97 in which the Ottomans side had been defeated at the Battle of Zenta and signed a treaty for the first time as the vanquished side; the loss of the Moslem-inhabited Crimean Peninsula\(^1\) in 1857; Iran’s defeat at the hands of the Russians and the subsequent loss of Dagestan, Arran\(^2\), Shīrvān\(^3\) and other Iranian territories in the Caucasus, and the signing of the two ignominious peace treaties of Golestān (1813) and Torkamancha\(^4\) (1828); Napoleon’s invasion of Egypt (1798) and the Levant\(^5\) (1799); and the conquest of the Indian subcontinent by the British, and the decisive victory of the British East India Company over the Moslems of Bengal at the Battle of Plassey\(^6\) on 23 June 1757.\(^7\)

While it is true that [the loss of] these lands within the territories of

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3. Also spelled as Sharvān, Shirwan, Shervan, Sherwan and Šervān; it is a region in present day Azerbāyjān in the eastern Caucasus.
7. [Reading 1757 for 1857.]
the Islamic world played a major part in the awakening of the Moslem peoples, it is also true that the Islamic Awakening is not limited to these [events] but pertains to the entirety of the Islamic world. Thus, it is possible to observe the phenomenon of the Islamic Awakening during the two hundred year history of the territories of Islam in such places as Central Asia¹, Southeast Asia², and Eastern Africa³. And on the basis of this same logic, it is also possible to posit an Islamic Awakening in the West itself as a subject that is worthy of further research.⁴

Given the range and extent of the variations that obtain in this phenomenon [throughout the Islamic world], we can identify four waves of awakening, each of which has its own special conditions and attributes, and which naturally have an effect on the successive waves.

The First Wave: Calling [to the Cause]

This wave is characterized mainly by its cultural and intellectual aspects and took place among the intellectual classes within the Islamic world. In other words, it was the intellectuals within the world of Islam who were the first to recall the peak of the Islamicate civilization when the decline of this civilization was confronted with the rise of Western civilization and its colonialist policies, as well as with the autocratic rule of despot within the Islamic world.⁵ During this phase, the general populace also stood up to the military invasions and colonialist policies

of the West, but generally speaking, this phase of the awakening was not witness to any organized or systemic popular resistance. And given the fact that the political affiliations and sympathies of any armed resistance was varied or unknown, it can be said that such resistance at this stage was more individual and *ad hoc* than group-based and part of a [political] movement.\(^1\)

The reasons as to why such liberation ideologies [that were expounded by the intellectuals] did not find widespread acceptance [at this time] can be found under the following two headings:

1. The failure to recognize and accept such thinking on the part of those in power\(^2\), as well as among a certain number of political intellectuals and social activists.

2. The novelty of the kind of thinking among the masses of the populace.

An analysis of the intellectual currents within Arabic civilization takes on a greater significance given the longevity and breadth of Arabic civilization in this intellectual wave. Arabic thought\(^3\), which has been

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2. For study about the attempts by Seyyed Jamal al-Din Asadābādi to attain the cooperation of the sultans of Iran and Ottomans, refer to: Asad Ābādi, Mirzā Lotfullah Khān, *Zendegi va Sharh Ahvāl va Āsār-e Seyyed Jamal al-Din Asadābādi*, Sahar, Tehran, 1977.

3. For the study of the current Arab political thought three methods have been used: 1. “the study of the trends” through books like, *Seyri dar Andishe-ye Siyāsi-ye Arab*, Hamid ‘Enāyat, and *Gerāyeshhā-ye Siyāsi dar Jahān-e Arab* by Majid Khadouri, 2. “the study of categories” through which the important categories of the society and politics have been considered; an outstanding book in this regard is *Andishe-ye Siyāsi dar Islam-e Mo’āser*, by Hamid ‘Enāyat; 3. “the study of thinkers”, through books such as Arabic Thought in the Liberal Ages (Oxford University Press, 1926 by Albert Hurani), and Zo’amā al-Islāh fi ‘Asr al-Hadīth, by Ahmad Amin.
influenced and shaped by successive crises\(^1\) in the contemporary era, exemplifies the adage that “political thought is generally a product of cycles of crises”\(^2\). One of the problems within this intellectual current has to do with the failure of the intellectuals within the Arab world properly to understand the issues that the Arabic world was confronted with, and consequently, their acceptance of solutions which were imported from the West and which thus detracted from their efficacy and usefulness.\(^3\)

The efforts of the intellectuals of the Islamic world to dig the Islamicate civilization out of its slump can be summarized in the following intellectual currents and political and social positions.

1. **The reliance on Western models for innovation and progress.**

   The following are the most important attributes of this tendency:

   1.1 Those who fall within this category generally accept the superiority of Western civilization\(^4\), and believe the Moslem people to be capable of enjoying such capabilities and of being able successfully to incorporate and assimilate Western technological innovations and the Western civilizational model more generally\(^5\). The basis of this kind of thinking is generally rationalized by the assumption that Western science and technology are rooted in the sciences that were transferred to the West

\(^1\) Refer to: Springs, Thomas, Understanding Political Theories, translated by Farhang Rajāī, p. 17, Āgāh, Tehran, 1991.


from the civilization of Islam.¹

1.2 The positive view that the people in this category have had of the West has caused them to be heedless of the West’s colonialist and exploitative policies, to the extent that such people never take an anti-Western position, and have full trust in the West’s good intentions, and see no contradiction between Islamic civilization and that of the European one.² In any event, “they view European civilization from a position of superiority”.³

1.3 The view of the people in this category is not pan-Islamic but, rather, is limited [geographically and ideologically].⁴

The following can be named as representatives of this group: Refā’ah Tahtāwī, Shabli Shamīl, Kheyr od-Dīn Pāshā at-Tūnisī, TāHā Hosayn, Ya’qūbSanū’, Mīrzā Malkam Khān, and Seyyed AhmanKhān.

In sum, those who belonged to this current do not have any religious priorities or commitments, and did not view Islam as a comprehensive program for moving their social and political program forward. Consequently, they were not able to establish a popular base among the people, and obviously, this was especially the case among the religiously devout segment of the population. Meanwhile, the territories of the

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Ottoman caliphate were under political pressure from the West, as well as being invaded militarily, due to its weakened state\(^1\). At the same time, the intellectual elite of these nations were under the spell of the West due to the cultural and political infiltration therefrom and looked to Western models and ideals.\(^2\) Thus, the masses of the people started to stand up to the colonialist powers by relying on small local groups that were dispersed throughout the land [and had no central organization and were not organized at a national level], and these groups were invariably headed by their religious leaders.\(^3\)

Of course it is also possible to find people within this group who have religious leanings, such as Seyyed Jamāl od-Dīn Asad-Ābādī [known as Afghānī outside Iran] and Shaykh Mohammad Abdoh, with the proviso that Abdoh is closer to the “Traditionalist” generation who anteceded him.

The primary spirit of reform of Seyyed Jamāl can be summarized in the words modernization and development. What he was after was for the Moslems also to gain a share in this new world and its civilization\(^4\); and it was for this reason that he placed an emphasis on the elements

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of Western civilization, i.e. science, reason, freedom, political parties, and the media.¹ And it is for this reason that although he had a deeper understanding of European civilization, he did not consider modernity and traditional religion as being irreconcilably contradictory.² That having been said, he considered more or less the entirety of the corpus of the traditional Islamic sciences as expired and damaged goods lacking any efficacy [for the contemporary world of Islam].³

Seyyed Jamāl od-Dīn Asad-Ābādī enjoyed good relations with the governments of many Islamic countries; he emphasized Islamic unity, and at the same time called for the Islamic community to resist Western hegemony.⁴ While rejecting a blind imitation of the West, he called for the use of Western science and industrial technology.⁵ He tried to contest European superiority by attempting to prove that Islamic civilization had a more advanced ideological basis and had more advanced social institutions.⁶

Next comes Mohammad Abdoh who, contrary to Seyyed Jamāl od-Dīn, was endowed with a revolutionary spirit. He appeared as a reformer and his position was closer to Rashīd Redā, the thinker who antecedent him. The main issue in the thought of Moslem thinkers such as Seyyed Jamāl od-Dīn and Mohammad Abdoh is the issue of progress, whereas

¹ Refer to: Hanafi, Hassan, Al-Osouliyyah al-Islamiyyah, p. 20, Maktabah Madbouli, Cairo, Bita.
² Refer to: Asadābādi, Seyyed Jamal al-Din, Majmou’eh Rasā’el va Maqālāt, supported by Seyyed Hadi Khosroshahi, p. 104, 118 and 197, Enteshārāt-e Kolbeh Shorouq, 2002.
⁴ Refer to: Asadābādi, Seyyed Jamal al-Din, Majmou’eh Rasā’el va Maqālāt, p. 121.
⁵ Refer to: Sharābi, Hishām, Roshanfekrān-e Arab va Gharb, translated by ‘Abdulrahmān ‘Ālem, p. 37.
⁶ Refer to: Ibid, p. 61.
the issue for those who came later was [Islamic] identity and the necessity of maintaining it, along with the issues as how best to do so in terms of method and approach.  

**Nationalism**

In the face of popular uprisings, the colonialists powers adopted a policy of promoting nationalism, particularly Arab nationalism among the Arabs, in addition to assassinating the leaders of the insurrectionary movements and influencing the policies of the movements towards liberal democratic ideals, as a way of attenuating the Islamic and anti-western feelings of the masses. These policies focused on national racial values and sought to position Islam in a secondary position and even to use it as a tool in the service of nationalism.

While the nationalist revolutions (which were comingled with socialist ideas as well) were initially successful, in practice they actually ended up facilitating and expediting the breakup of the Ottoman Empire, and were

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unable to address the economic problems of the Islamic nations\(^1\), and ultimately ended up degenerating into dictatorships.\(^2\)

**The Return to Islamic Values (The “Islamists”)**

After the failure of the ideologies of those who were oriented toward Western ideals and values, as well as that of nationalism, the Moslem peoples saw the best way of promoting the interests of their civilization in the return to the principles and tenets of their religion. This Islamist tendency can be categorized and analyzed on two levels.

1. **The Traditionalists**

This group can be contrasted with the group within the First Wave, i.e. those oriented toward Western ideals and values who thought of religion as a symptom of the intellectual backwardness of the Moslem peoples\(^3\), and who believed that the only way for their salvation was to rely on Western models of progress.\(^4\) Thus, the Traditionalists emphasized a return to traditional and authentic Islamic values and an avoidance of all things Western.\(^5\) As such, they did not interfere much in social and

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4. In *Maʿālim fi al-Tariq* (Signs of the Road), Seyyed Qutb has included a chapter titled as “Islam is the very Civilization” in response to these people (Seyyed Qutb, *Maʿālim fi al-Tariq*, Dāral-Sharq, translated by Mahmoud Mahmoudi).
5. Seyyed Qutb wrote the book “*Shubahāt Howl al-Islam*” in response to these people, Refer to *Islam va Nābesāmānihā-ye Roshanfekrān*, Seyyed Qutb, translated by Mohammad ‘Ābedi.
political matters and pursued their religious ideals at the level of the individual.

Rashīd Redā is one of the renowned thinkers [of this Traditionalists group] within the Arab world who is separated from the reformist and progressive platforms of people like Seyyed Jalāl od-Dīn Astar-Ābādī and Mohammad Abdoh. ¹Rashīd Redā’s project involved the reconstruction of the Islamic community by means of reforming the Islamic caliphate in conformance with the way it was structured in the early years of Islam,² and in such a way as to incorporate the ideals of the early Islamic caliphate.³

Another element which distanced Rashīd Redā from Seyyed Jalāl od-Dīn Astar-Ābādī’s emphasis on Islamic unity was his Wahhabist leanings.⁴ Furthermore, Rashīd Redā was highly critical of the Moslem rulers of his time,⁵ was militantly anti-Western in his outlook,⁶ and was vehemently against any nationalist ideology.⁷

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¹ Refer to: Khadouri Majid, Gerāyeshhā-ye Siyāsi dar Jahān-e Arab, p. 76; Hassan Hanafi, ‘Al-Osul al-Islāmiyyah, p. 42.
⁴ Refer to: Sharābi, Hishām, Roshanfekrān-e Arab va Gharb, translated by ‘Abdulrahmān ‘Ālem, p. 55 and 124; Rashid Rezā, Mohammad, Al-Sunnah wa al-Shi’ah, p. 54 – 59, n. n., Cairo, 1366 A H.
⁵ Refer to: Khadouri Majid, Gerāyeshhā-ye Siyāsi dar Jahān-e Arab, p. 78 and 79.
⁷ Refer to: Ibid, p. 126.
2. The “Civilizationalists” (tamaddon-gerāyān)

Another grouping was formed against the Westernist\(^1\) and Traditionalist camps who can be characterized as the “Civilizationalists” (tamaddon-gerāyān). This group put forth new ideas concerning the definition of religion, its function and limits, the relationship between this world and that of the hereafter, the relationship between religion and science and religion and reason, and the relationship between revelation and human empirical experience. This group offered a new interpretation [of the meanings] of religion and tradition. While positing a civilizational dimension for Islam, they also distinguished between Western culture and its intellectual heritage on one hand, and the superficial aspects of its scientific and technological elements on the other.

With this outlook, the “Civilizationalists” brought about a change in the presence of religion in the social domain, and by rejecting the restriction of religion to the individual’s practice, they laid new cultural and social foundations [for religion] on the basis of Islamic principles. Thinkers in this group include Imam Khomeinī, Shahīd Mohammad Bāqer Sadr, and Seyyed Qotb, whose thought offered a new approach concerning how to confront the West so as to advance the interests of the Islamic world. Imam Khomeini, with his book hokūmat-e eslāmī\(^2\) (Islamic Governance), and Shahīd Mohammad Bāqer Sadr with his books Eqtesādunā and falsafatunā (Our Economics and Our Philosophy) emphasized the civilizational aspects of Islam. Seyyed Qotb also wrote many books in this same vein.\(^3\)

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2. Reading this for “velāyat-e faqīh”.
3. The Future in the Realm of Islam(المستقبل لهذا الدين), Islam and the Civilization Problems(الإسلام)
In addition to the above, the following can be named among those who contributed to this movement with an emphasis in their writings on the cultural and civilizational bases of Islam, calling the Moslems to a new outlook for regaining the lost ascendancy of Islam:

1. Mohammad Qotb, *The Twentieth Century Age of Ignorance (Jāhelīat)*


The Second Wave: Laying the Foundations for Political Movements and Action

With the advent of the ideology of the “Civilizationalists”, the Moslem peoples entered a new phase within the general framework of Islamic movements; a phase which placed the religion of Islam at the center of the struggle [against Western colonialist ambitions], and of social and political reform. Certainly, the modernist and nationalist\(^1\) elements also laid foundations for political movements, but these were not able to gain much traction in the struggle against colonialism and dictatorship, and were not able to attract the masses of the populations of their respective nations. Thus, by strengthening the peoples-centered elements, the Islamic resistance movements entered a new phase.\(^2\) These new movements were

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\(^1\) Some even consider the fall of nationalism as the ground for the second stage of Islamic Awakening (Refer to: Ibid, p. 96).

formed in all societies within the territories of Islam and were not limited to a given class, becoming the organized and social replacements of individual efforts.1

The formation of Islamist political movements starts from the decade of the 1960’s in the nations within Islamicate civilization, and these movements gain momentum both in terms of their intellectual and organizational quality as well as in terms of their affiliations and membership in the 1980’s, such that it can be said that the Islamic Awakening [(usually known in the West as the “Arab” Spring)] can be said to be the result of the efforts of the groups within this movement over the past half century.2

The Moslem Brotherhood of Egypt can be considered to be a turning point in the current of Islamic movements.3 Hasan al-Bannā, the founder of the Moslem Brotherhood of Egypt states the following concerning the Islamic reformers: “[Jalāl od-Dīn] Asadābādī was merely a cautionary cry for the problems [which we faced], and Shaykh Mohammad Abdoh was merely a teacher and thinker, and Rashīd Redā was merely a historian and a chronicler of events; whereas [the advent of] the Moslem Brotherhood means [entering into the field of political] struggle, work and the exertion of effort, and is not merely a manifesto”.4

One of the basic beliefs of the Moslem Brotherhood is the belief in

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3. Refer to: Enayat Hamid, Political Thought in Contemporary Islam, p. 158.
the unstoppable capacity of Islam in resolving the social and political problems of the Moslem peoples.¹

Seyyed Qotb is a prominent example of the intellectual current within the Moslem Brotherhood. From his perspective, the only legal and legitimate government is [one which governs in accordance with the demands of] God’s sovereignty.² By making a distinction between an “Islamic society” and a “Jāhelī Society” [i.e. one that is based on the ways of the pre-Islamic pagan Era of Ignorance], he posited the way of attaining to the former as being that of revolutionary action, and not that of abstract thought.³

In his redefinition of what proper and legitimate development is and what improper development is, Seyyed Qotb posited the use of ethical norms as a basic criterion for progress and development.⁴ This is where the difference between his approach and that of the modernist Moslem vanguard who had accepted the Western developmental model and looked to Western models becomes apparent. Thus, it can be said, with Bobby Sa’īd, that the Civilizationalist movement is characterized by their insistence on a non-Westcentric ideology and political model which sets aside that original meek and submissive attitude to the West which characterized the original thinkers within the initial movements of the Islamic Awakening, and which relates a narrative concerning the

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². Refer to: Seyyed Qutb, *Ma’ālim fi al-Tariq*, Dāral-Sharq, p. 60, 61, 116, and 117, Beirut, Cairo, 1980
³. Ibid, p. 60 and 61.
encounter of the Islamic world with modernity which does not imitate that of the West’s.¹

While it is true that Seyyed Qotb wrote many treatises concerning the social and political dimensions of Islam and was executed as a consequence of his efforts², but irrespective of this, it is Imam Khomeini who must be considered as the greatest Moslem thinker [within this movement], for in addition to explicating the social and political dimensions of Islam [in his writings and declarations], he also took the reins of the leadership of the Islamic community, and brought the Islamic movement of the people of Iran to its triumphant conclusion in the Islamic Revolution of 1978-79; a victory which was denied the other nations of the Islamic world. Therefore, Imam Khomeini should be considered to be the most prominent personality within this stage of the Islamic Awakening. Imam Khomeini integrated the institutions of religion and state and approached sacred jurisprudence (feqh) and Islamic transcendental thought (erfān) within their social and political contexts. In addition to this basic orientation and ideology, Imam Khomeini also emphasized the need to bear the international aspects of the Islamic movement in mind; and by exporting the model and values of the Islamic Revolution of Iran, his revolutionary movement had a major influence on other Islamic movements throughout the Islamic world at large. In this way, in addition to being a political leader who found acceptance and was looked upon with favor among the various factions within the Iranian political scene, such as the Leftists, the Nationalists,


2. Zeinab al-Ghazali, the head of the ward of the women of Akhawān al-Muslemin in Egypt, Alghazali, syas: “If you want to know why Seyyed Qutb was hanged, read Al-Mā’ālim fi Tariq.” Refer to: Zeinab, *Ayyām min Hayāti*, Beirut, Cairo, 1979.
the Sunni minorities and even among the Tudeh (Communist) Party, as well as the masses of the people of course, Imam Khomeini became an international figure and his movement and revolution were turned into exemplary models of resistance in the Islamic world and throughout the Third World.¹

The current situation within the world of Islam is that an Islam that is politically awake and engaged has a major presence on the political scene within each of the major Islamicate countries, such that every non-Islamic regime within these territories must deal with these movements as a political force to be contended with and is not immune to the “Islamist” challenge. It is very clear that a cultural revolution has taken place in these countries, and that the influence of “Islamism” is no longer limited to the religious domain, but has transcended this [artificial] boundary to make itself felt in people’s intellectual outlooks, their social and economic relations, and not least, in the political process. In fact, it can be stated that the “Islamists” have been successful in determining the framework in the political discourse [of their respective countries] and have even gone so far as to determine national policy [in certain instances] and influenced mass media with their slogans and refrains, so much so that they have either eliminated or marginalized their non-religious ideological rivals, be they Arab nationalists, socialists, or liberal democrats.²


The Third Wave: Political Systematization

Upon their victory over their political opponents in the political arena, it is incumbent on the Islamist movements to put forward a political program which includes a constitutional order on the basis of which society can be governed and administered. Thus, what it comes down to is that it is incumbent upon the Moslems to offer an alternative to liberal democracy that is based on the principles and teachings of their religion.¹ In other words, in order for the Islamist movements to be able to sustain their path and remain in the arena of social and political struggle, they must enter into the fray of the administration of society and become involved with the task of governance. And it must be noted that, given the social and political climate in Islamic societies, the formation of political parties, participating in the electoral process, and gaining a number of parliamentary or congressional seats is very different than the formation of a fully Islamic system of governance.² Thus it can be said that the only way for saving the Moslem masses from the tyranny of colonialism and the despotism of dictators is the realization of a full-fledged powerful Islamic system of governance based on the authentic religious tenets of Islam, and not based on a watered down version of Islam that would be acceptable to non-Islamic forms of governance, be they Western or otherwise.³

³ Governmental religion refers to a society in which the people are Muslims but the government is not religious (secular government); however if the government is formed based on religious values, pursuing the practice of the rules of Islam, then the religious government is formed. Refer to: Mir Ahmadi, Mansour, Secularism-e Islami, Naqdi bar Didgāh-e Roshanfekrān-e Moslamān, Pazhuheshgāh-e ‘Lum va Farhang-e Islami, Qom, 2008.
The best example of this phase of the Islamic Awakening is the constitutional order of the Islamic Republic of Iran which established a religious order on the ashes of a dictatorial hereditary monarchy. What is interesting to note is that the case of Iran is one where the stages of the political movements and political struggle were weaker or developed relatively late, but at the same time, Iran was where the stage of the formation of an Islamic order took place at a much greater speed; and this took place at a time that preceded the fact of Moslem thinkers in other countries even having proposed the formation of Islamic government.

In the Sunni world, the return to the institution of the caliphate had been proposed by various thinkers. Rashīd Redā, for example, who is one of the founders of the Salafist ideology, made such a proposal early on. His practical plan of action was for a universal caliphate to be declared which would be centered on the present city of Mosul, and for the leaders of the Islamic world to pledge allegiance to the Imam al-Hādī, who was the leader of the Zaydīs of Yemen at the time. In the Shī’a world, Ayatollah Nāīnī presented the idea of the formation of an Islamic form of governance in the modern era in a book called Tanhīh ol-Omma wa Tanzīh al-Mella, and Imam Khomeini put forward the version that is present today [in the Islamic Republic of Iran] with his proposal of the theory of velāyat-e faqīh or the governance of the jurisconsult.

In addition to these theoretical considerations, there were some practical measures taken as well. In northern Nigeria, for example, at the beginning of the nineteenth century, Othman danFodio established an Islamic order which lasted almost a hundred years. There were other more or less successful efforts of this sort in the Sunni world as well. In the Sudan, Hasan al-Torābi, a thinker affiliated with the Moslem Brotherhood, overthrew the non-religious government of Ja’far Nomīrī with the help
of Omar al-Bashīr and established an Islamic form of government with the claim of implementing the *sharī’a* or sacred law of Islam. In a similar vein, Najm od-Dīn Arbakān founded the Refāh (Welfare) Party [in Turkey] with the unannounced intention (for fear of the army generals) of establishing an Islamic form of governance, and after much effort and many changes of tactics, was eventually able to enter into a coalition government with Tansu Ciller whose most prominent hallmarks included the reinstatement of the *hejāb* or Islamic veil for women, re-inaugurating the institution of the Friday Prayer, and the institution of schools for Friday Prayer leaders. This path was continued successfully by the Virtue Party (1998–2001) and the Justice and Development Party (2001–2014; 2017–present) under the leadership of Recep Tayyip Erdoğan to the point where the Islamist of Turkey were voted into office for both the office of the Prime Minister as well as that of the President of the Republic. In Algeria, the Islamic Salvation Front was established under the leadership of Abbās Madanī in order to bring about an Islamic form of governance to the country; this party expanded rapidly, such that it was able to gain the majority of the votes in all of the cities of Algeria in their municipal elections.

Within the Shī’a world, Ayatollah Seyyed Absol-Hosayn Lārī was able to establish an Islamic form of governance in the south of Iran on the basis of the theory of the Governance of the Jurist around the turn of the twentieth century. And it might also be possible to consider the reign of Mīrzā Kūchīk Khān-e Jangalī in Gīlān which took place under the auspices of the Islamic Unity Party as an imperfect example of governments which fall within the ambit of Islamic governance, if we give this definition a wider berth.

Another example of such incomplete attempts to establish an Islamic
form of governance can be seen in the unsuccessful attempt to have the “Sharī’a Legislation” pass the Pakistani legislative chamber during the time of Zīā ol-Haqq’s premiership. The changing of the name of Pakistan to the Islamic Republic of Pakistan is another example.

In addition to the above mentioned examples, other instances can be found within the annals of the Islamic movements of the Moslem world which, despite the fact that each differs from the others in terms of its political, juridical and religious bases, they share the common aim of establishing an Islamic form of government; the Taliban, Daesh or the so-called “Islamic State”, and the Ansārollah movement of the Zeydīs of the Yemen are three such instances. In sum, if one takes a step back and looks at the big picture, one can see that today, it is the ideological and political aspiration of all of the Islamic movements within the Islamic world to establish Islamic forms of governance within their respective nations and states, and that they are “ideologically and politically united in this common purpose”.¹

In fact, this is so much the case that it can be said that the perfected model of the Islamic Awakening is latent in the various forms of political Islam; in other words, we can say that political Islam is born by passing through the earlier theoretical stages [of resistance against illegitimate forms of government] and by entering into the practical stage of action.

In political Islam, Islam becomes transformed into an ideology for confronting, resisting and rising up against illegitimate forms of governance.

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¹ Refer to: Raf”at, Seyyed Ahmad, and ‘Amro al-Shubeki, The Future of the Islamic Movements, after September 2011, translated by Meytham Shirvāni, p. 21 – 23, Imam Sādiq University, Tehran, 1999; also refer to: Dekmajian, H. Islam in the Revolution: Contemporary Islamic Movement in the Arab World (Study of the Islamic fundamentalist phenomenon), translated by Hamid Ahmadi, p. 112, 113.
government, be they internal or external (as in the case of colonial and neo-colonial rule in all its forms). In political Islam, the principles and tenets of Islam are utilized to develop a program for the establishment of a constitutional order based on the teachings of Islam whose purpose is to secure and maintain these principles and tenets, and for the construction of a society that is governed on the basis of Islamic principles. Thus, political Islam begets a modern and progressive society in the contemporary era; or, to put it slightly differently, political Islam is the result of attaining to [a *modus vivendi* with] modernity in Islamic societies.\(^1\)

**The Fourth Wave: Islamic Civilization**

The previous three waves laid the groundwork for the fourth wave. In fact, the actual realization [of the values and ideals] of the first three waves are crystalized in the Islamic civilization [of the fourth wave]. The fourth wave of the Islamic Awakening and the end result of the formation of Islamic forms of governance and Islamic constitutional orders is the formation of Islamic civilization. The links of the chain of the Islamic Awakening are connected to each other, and there is no choice but to go on to the next stage if the present stage is to be perfected and fully realized. And this is why Islamic civilization which is the fourth stage in the Islamic Awakening phenomenon must be on the intellectual horizon of the overall historical phenomenon, as this is the only way in which the values that obtained in the first three preliminary stages can be institutionalized and afforded the protection of constitutional law.\(^2\)

In its encounter with the Islamic world, the West brought all of its

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civilizational powers to bear in order to colonize and exploit the territories of Islam and the Moslem peoples. The Islamic Awakening was the reaction and resistance that the Islamic world displayed in the face of this civilizational exploitation and wonton aggression. Thus, in order for the Islamic world to get to this final stage, it needed to go through the earlier phases, which can be summed up as follows: having posited a God-centric universe in opposition to the humanist or human-centered universe of the secular West, in the social and political domains, the Islamic world also posited such theories as “the governance of the religious jurist” and “religious democracy” as challenges to the liberal democratic order of the West. Ultimately, it is these theories which the Islamic world has proposed as alternatives to their Western counterparts which must be protected and maintained by the establishment and sustenance of Islamic civilizations under the aegis of Islamic constitutional orders.

Conclusion

The proper understanding of social phenomena depends of various elements, the most important of which is the intellectual and cultural context or the philosophy of history [of a given society], which includes the unspoken epistemological and ontological assumptions of that society. Taking these elements into consideration gives one a better understanding of changes that are taking place at the macro level of that society, as individual phenomena are interconnected and are thus only comprehensible in their larger civilizational context.

On the basis of the above and taking into account the theory of the evolution of history which posits a teleological progression,¹ it is

possible to analyze the Islamic Awakening with an outlook which takes into account the philosophy of history within the context of worldviews which take the big picture into account. On the basis of this worldview, the Islamic movements can be seen to obtain as part of the ebb and flow of Islamic civilization and as a part of the teleological process whereby Islam and the nations who have faith therein will prevail over the world of infidelity and unbelief.\(^1\)

The element which provides socio-political continuity for the phenomenon of the Islamic Awakening in the context of Islamic history and with reference to all of the other changes that are taking place in the world of Islam is the civilizational orientation that places a burden of duty on Islam and on the Moslem peoples to take on the responsibility for realizing the social and political dimensions of their religion.

While it is true that today, the Islamic Awakening has taken on economic and political dimensions, its most prominent and primary attribute which informs all other elements is the quest of the Moslem peoples for their identity [in the changing contexts of modernity] which restores their civilizational dignity and honor; an honor which the Moslem peoples obtained in past centuries by holding firm to the teachings of Islam and by maintaining their communal unity [of purpose]. And this is why they opted for a movement which is comprehensive and is based on the teachings of Islam, so that they will be able to restore their past identity and glory thereby; as these goals are only obtainable under the auspices of a big picture, civilizational approach to the issues at hand.

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And this is why, the more the Islamic Awakening has progressed over the last two centuries, the more its socio-political and civilizational aspects have been emphasized at the expense of its individual elements.

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